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From 1770 t o 1914, the British Government collected weekly price and 
quantity data for all types of grain traded in many market towns; these ‘Corn 
Returns’ were published in the London Gazette. We computerised the data 
published 1770-1864, totalling around 6 million data points. Here we describe 
the nature of these data; discuss why, when and how they were collected; 
consider their accuracy and biases; describe how we computerised them; and 
offer caveats in using these – and similar – data. We highlight the problem of 
drawing valid inferences in the face of price impact from fluctuating grain 




The British Government made concerted and sustained efforts to monitor the grain 
trade throughout England, Wales and Scotland, 1770-1914. At its minimum, this 
project involved collection and publication of weekly prices for five different grains 
for 44 counties or regions; at its maximum, it covered weekly prices and quantities 
traded for seven grains for 290 towns. In total, the Government collected in excess of 
6 million data points, 1770-1914. Generally referred to as the Corn Returns, they have 
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been widely used to construct cost of living indices (Phelps Brown and Hopkins 1954; 
Clark 2001),1 measure market integration (Shiue and Keller 2007; Jacks 2011), infer 
rates of return on commodities (Brunt and Cannon 2012), and even explain cognitive 
ability (Baten et al., 2012). We computerised all the available data up t o 1864 t o 
analyse market integration and other aspects of British economic development. 
Several recent studies using British grain prices utilize the data set we created, which 
we describe here (Jacks, 2011; Baten et al., 2012; Brunt and Cannon 2012). 
Given their importance in economic historical analysis – international 
comparative work, as well as purely British research – remarkably little consideration 
has been given to the characteristics and qualities of these data. Nothing systematic 
has been written on t he subject since Vamplew’s critique 32 years ago (Vamplew, 
1980a). He cast doubt on their representativeness but his critique contains several 
inaccuracies and misunderstandings that we set straight here. We introduce the data to 
a wider audience so that other researchers can use them with a just degree of 
confidence. Some data have already been placed in the ESRC data archive, some we 
are making available alongside this paper and the rest will be made available in the 
near future. 
Such a broad and long data set inevitably varies over time, in terms of data 
collected and format adopted. Hence numerous issues must be considered in a 
comprehensive survey of the Corn Returns. However, given how frequently the basis 
and format of modern government statistics change, it will be a pleasant surprise to 
most economists how unchanging were the Corn Returns through 135 years. 
Section 1 begins by considering the historical background to the Corn Returns 
– why, when, where and how they were collected and published. Section 2 considers 
the accuracy of the Corn Returns data set. Section 3 considers potential biases in the 
data. Section 4 provides some simple data description. Appendix 1 contains a full list 
of towns for every period. Appendix 2 di scusses nomenclature. Appendix 3 
                                                 
1 Some authors prefer the retail price of bread, such as Feinstein (1998); retail bread prices and 
wholesale wheat prices track each other closely over time, not least because the assize of bread 
regulated the price of bread as a function of the price of wheat or (later) flour – see Kirkland (1895). 
Fluctuations in the cost of milling led to some temporary divergence between the price of grain and the 
price of flour (and hence bread); see Bennett and Elton (1904, vol. 3, p. 292). 
3 
establishes the county allocation of Bristol (physically split between two counties). 
Appendix 4 examines London data deficiency. Appendix 5 outlines the data collection 
process. Appendix 6 considers missing observations. 
 
1. Historical background of the Corn Returns 
The Government attempted to regulate the domestic grain price between the 1690s 
and 1840s, using a raft of legislation known as the Corn Laws (the classic account to 
be found in Barnes 1930). Regulatory aims were two-fold. First, the Government 
wanted to keep up pr ices to encourage investment in agriculture and generate an 
increase in productive capacity (Gras 1967, pp. 145-7; Fay 1932, pp. 20-1). This was 
seemingly successful, since farmers undertook investments that led to permanent 
increases in productive capacity, such as reclaiming land in marshy areas (Darby 
1951). Second, the Government wanted to smooth domestic prices to insure farmers 
and consumers against excessive fluctuations (Fay 1932, pp. 20 -1). Grain was the 
staple food item of the population and demand was highly inelastic; since grain 
harvests fluctuated wildly from year to year, smoothing prices was difficult. When 
grain output and prices were about average, imports were subject to high tariffs 
(sometimes banned) to raise domestic prices and encourage agricultural investment. 
In plentiful years, prices fell very low and the Government reacted by giving farmers 
an export bounty (i.e. it paid farmers to export grain and remove it from domestic 
markets) (Fay 1932, pp. 12-4). In years of dearth, the price rose very high and there 
was no tariff to pay (i.e. there was a de facto price ceiling lying somewhere above the 
world price, as determined by the declining tariff schedule). 
Regulating domestic prices was difficult without official price series (Gras 
1967, pp. 149 -50). Initially, importation and exportation were based on the honour 
system – and hence widely abused (Ormrod 1985, p. 24; Barnes 1930, pp. 16 -8). To 
import grain tariff-free, the captain of a vessel simply had to swear before a l ocal 
worthy that market prices in the port were above a certain (high) price laid down by 
statute; to export grain and claim the bounty, the captain simply had to swear before a 
local worthy that market prices in the port were below a certain (low) price laid down 
by statute (Ormrod 1985, appendix 4(i)). It happened that vessels loaded with grain 
arrived one day tariff-free (the captain swearing that prices were high) and departed 
next day claiming the bounty (the captain swearing that prices were low). Obviously, 
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this could happen only if grains prices fell enormously overnight. In fact, it was 
widely reported that perjury was rampant – on the part of captains and local worthies, 
being in cahoots – and the Government was effectively being turned into a ‘money 
pump’ (Barnes 1930, 26 ). Customs Service corruption was also problematic (Hoon 
1938, pp. 230 -1, 240-1, 261). Eventually, deficits mounted in the Treasury grain 
department because it paid more in bounties than it collected in tariffs (Barnes 1930, 
pp. 23-4). Parliament then acted to prevent further abuses. The solution from 1770 
onwards was to compile an official grain prices series. Thus the Corn Returns were 
born. 
Precise details of how the system operated in the first few years are unclear 
because many Parliamentary papers for that period were lost when the old 
Westminster Palace (the home of the Houses of Parliament) burnt down in 1834. 
However, we know the outlines for the early period and have detailed information 
from 1791 onw ards. By the Act of 1770, l ocal Justices of the Peace (JPs) were 
required to send to London weekly price data drawn from two to six market towns in 
their jurisdiction; since a specific list of towns was not stipulated, it is not known 
which towns were actually monitored under this Act.2 The JPs appointed a “proper 
person” residing in each market town to collect prices; how they should be collected 
was not stipulated. Under the Act of 1781, a  newly-appointed Inspector of Corn 
Returns reported prices prevailing in the London market, calculated as weighted 
averages based on s worn trade accounts rendered by every factor trading in the 
market (21 George III cap. 50). The Act of 1789 extended this system nationwide (29 
George III cap. 58). Inspectors forwarded returns of all sales of domestic produce – 
where “all sales” specifically includes resales of grain that had already been traded in 
the market – to a Receiver of Corn Returns in London (Giffen 1879, pp. 712-4). The 
Receiver calculated average prices for each county and each District (Districts being 
groups of contiguous counties), together with national average prices. 
How effective was this administrative machinery and did it change over time? 
One relevant metric is completeness of the returns. Figure 1 r eports annual 
percentages of missing observations for wheat, 1770-1820. The series is 97 per cent 
complete from the very beginning, rising to 99.6 per cent by 1771. N otice the 
                                                 
2 10 George II cap. 39; text reported in Ruffhead, Statutes, vol. 8, p. 119; and in Pickering, Statutes, 
vol. 34. The text of other Acts cited here was reported by the same sources. 
5 
temporary decline in completeness in 1791, down to 98.5 per cent, when the list of 
towns was set by statute at 210. It seems likely that this involved a significant 
extension or reallocation of towns and it took a few weeks to find Corn Inspectors for 
some towns. Evidence supporting this hypothesis comes from the addition of Cardiff 
to the list on 18 March 1823, when the returns state explicitly that no inspector was 




The Corn Laws were always a matter of widespread concern. Ports were 
opened or closed to grain importation in response to average prices (Vamplew 1980b, 
382-3). Farmers and landowners desired high prices; corn factors and industrialists 
sought free trade, which implied lower grain prices and lower wage bills for 
industrialists (Fairlie 1965, p. 562). Official price series were therefore a battleground 
because changing the calculation method of average prices could affect the likelihood 
of ports opening to trade. This in turn meant the Corn Returns were subject to 
widespread public scrutiny and frequent consideration was given to refining them (for 
example, The Morning Chronicle, 8 March 1853, p. 3). 
Even after the Government ceased regulating domestic grain prices – at Corn 
Law repeal in 1846 – the Corn Returns continued to play an important economic role. 
Traditionally, farmers paid a ten per cent tithe on output to the Church of England. 
But both sides recognised that taxes on marginal product discouraged farmers from 
raising output; and tithe collection, with its necessarily invasive inquisition into 
production of each farmer, made the clergy very unpopular (Evans 1976, pp. 128-32). 
Hence, the 1836 T ithe Commutation Act introduced a “corn rent”. That is, farmers 
agreed to pay the Church each year the money equivalent of a fixed number of 
bushels of each grain type (see, for example, Pyne 1837). This eliminated disincentive 
effects of taxation because farmers collected every extra unit of output; but it also 
meant that in high price years, when farmers had high incomes, the Church received 
higher tax revenues. Evans (1993, p. 17 ) reports that 93 pe r cent of tithes were 
commuted by 1852 – around half agreed voluntarily between titheholders and 
landholders and half imposed by tithe commissioners (see also Kain 1995, p. 13) . 
Studd (1889, p. 13) says commutation was “practically complete” by 1889. Tax rates 
per notional bushel were set according to official price series from the Corn Returns, 
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averaged over the preceding seven years (Vamplew 1981, p. 115;  Giffen 1879, pp.  
714-5). Recall that the Corn Returns include only domestic grain in their calculations. 
This was ideal because both farmers and Church wanted corn rents to reflect prices 
that farmers were actually receiving for their output. In fact, much of the analysis of 
the Corn Returns in the late nineteenth century (such as Parliamentary enquiries of the 
1870s) was prompted by farmers and Church leaders trying to improve their economic 
position by revising Corn Return reporting methods (British Government 1870, 1878-
9a, 1878-9b). 
So the Corn Returns were produced by a peculiar set of circumstances – the 
desire to regulate taxation or international trade by reference to market prices of 
domestically produced goods. Hence the Corn Returns generated a peculiar data 
source. They give us prices of only those agricultural goods traded internationally (i.e. 
grain products) – but prices based solely on the part of the market not traded 
internationally (i.e. grain produced and traded domestically).3 In some ways this 
generates a very clean data set: for example, there is no quality variation over time 
due to increased import penetration. In other ways this makes the data of limited use: 
for example, the Corn Returns do not  give us average prices of grains actually 
consumed, because imports are excluded. Whether or not the peculiarities of the data 
are a b enefit or a h indrance overall, we certainly need to be aware of them when 
undertaking any economic analysis. 
 
2. Data accuracy 
We can distinguish four stages in production of the Corn Returns. First, local 
Inspectors gathered data, calculated averages for their towns, and forwarded the 
information to the Receiver of Corn Returns. Second, the Receiver inspected the data 
for accuracy and computed county averages (in the early period), before sending the 
results to the publisher. Third, the printer set the relevant London Gazette page and 
                                                 
3 Imported grain traded in the same physical markets as domestic grain; the largest market – Mark 
Lane, in London – traded both domestic grain and a wide array of foreign grains, as evidenced by price 
quotations reported in contemporary newspapers. But traders were required to make returns of trades in 
British produce only (even if they also traded in foreign produce). 
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published it. Fourth, we transcribed data into machine-readable format and checked it. 
Database accuracy is determined by errors introduced at each stage of production.  
2.1 Local Inspectors 
The 1770 Act required JPs for each county to monitor wheat, barley, oat and bean 
prices in a number of market towns (10 George III, cap. 39). The JP had to appoint a 
resident Inspector of Corn Returns for each monitored town; and, for every return 
provided, these Inspectors were paid from the county rate (this being a local land tax 
used to finance local expenditures such as road repair, and of which the salary costs of 
Inspectors of Corn Returns would have been a miniscule proportion). The JP was also 
to provide an official Measure of one Winchester bushel of eight gallons, so the 
returns could be made in standard units (shillings and pence per Winchester Bushel). 
As of 13 July 1827, returns were made in shillings and pence per Imperial bushel (3.2 
per cent larger than the Winchester bushel). Once Inspectors had collected these 
returns, they sent them to the Receiver at the Treasury, who published the results in 
the London Gazette, the official Government newspaper. 
The 1791 Act over-hauled the machinery for price collection, making it more 
rigorous in several important respects. First, the Act stipulated the monitored towns in 
each county (31 George III, cap. 30, § 45 and 61). Second, for each town the local JP 
had to choose grain Inspectors who were “qualified persons” but not themselves 
engaged in the grain trade; millers, maltsters, and various other professions were 
explicitly excluded (31 George III, cap. 30, § 47). Third, every grain factor in each 
town had to make a return every Monday to the local Inspector, detailing his entire 
trade during the week and giving total quantity traded at each price. The return was 
made under oath and penalty for non-compliance was £10 per week; in 2010 values, 
this was somewhere between £938 (based on changes in the retail price index) and 
£11 900 (based on changes in average earnings) (31 George III, cap. 30, § 50; value 
comparisons based on the eh.net application, “How much is that?”). Fourth, once they 
received the grain factors’ returns, the Inspectors forwarded this information to the 
Receiver every Tuesday. Again, the return was made under oath and penalty for non-
compliance was £10 pe r week (31 George III, cap. 30, § 51). Inspectors were paid 
five shillings (£0.25) per return, more if the duties were particularly onerous (31 
George III, cap. 30, § 71).  
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Despite stringent requirements in the 1791 Act, doubts were expressed about 
performance of local Inspectors, both by contemporaries and later researchers 
(Vamplew 1980a). Parliament thus tightened up the system still further in later years. 
For example, JPs were given greater discretion in 1820 in setting payments per return, 
to ensure they could find suitably qualified candidates; Inspectors were given the 
power to inspect trade books of corn factors (evidence of William Fearnside, Mark 
Lane corn dealer: British Government 1834, p. 115); and in 1842 the duties were 
transferred to local Excisemen, who worked directly for the Inland Revenue 
Department of central government (Vamplew 1980a, p. 6). Even in the face of these 
efforts to ensure full compliance, throughout the whole period two features of the data 
suggest that there was substantial under-reporting of trade.  
First, several Inspectors returned “None Sold” almost every week – including 
some Inspectors in large towns, such as Macclesfield and Stockport, where it is hard 
to believe that there was genuinely never any trade. In fact, this type of omission is 
not really a problem: de facto, the Macclesfield and Stockport grain markets were not 
monitored and can be excluded from the sample. This does not noticeably reduce 
density or geographical distribution of coverage. 
Second, some towns furnishing regular returns often seem to have had very 
low levels of trade. For example, the major port and market town of Bristol – with 
forty corn factors – reports weekly wheat trade of only around 240 bushels. This is an 
incredibly low figure, bearing in mind that wheat was the staple food grain and most 
wheat was traded off the farm into towns.4 All the major market towns of the 
kingdom were monitored; so, overall, we might expect to see almost the entire wheat 
crop of the kingdom passing through monitored markets. In fact, we observe trade 
volumes equal to only around 25 per cent of total domestic output (Fairlie 1969, p. 96 
                                                 
4 Collins, ‘Why wheat?’. Petersen, Bread, chapter 7, especially pp. 190-204, suggests that wheat was 
the staple for 63 per cent English and Welsh consumers in 1770, rising to perhaps 80 per cent by 1801 
and 90 per cent by 1841.  
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and appendix 2).5 What happened to the rest, and is there a systematic difference 
between grain that we observe and the rest? 
First, note that we would expect to see only net output traded in the market. 
Caird suggests yields of 27 bushels per acre and seeding rates around 2.5 bushels per 
acre (Caird 1852, p. 522); so around 10 per cent of total output was retained for seed 
(as we discuss in more detail below). Grain was also retained for on-farm 
consumption. Brunt and Meidell (2012) show that around 10 pe r cent of the 
population resided on farms in 1801 ( including farmers and their families and farm 
servants, but not agricultural labourers – who presumably bought their wheat through 
the market as flour). If people on f arms ate like the rest of the population, then 
roughly another 10 per cent of wheat would be retained on the farm and not enter the 
market. Around 6.5 per cent of output was “tail corn” (low-quality grain that was not 
traded, which discuss in more detail below). So around 25 per cent of total output 
would have been retained on-farm – perhaps more before 1801, when the farm 
population was proportionately larger and yields were lower (so seed consumed a 
higher proportion of total output). Nonetheless, we observe only around 25 per cent of 
total output being traded – rather than 75 per cent – and we must ask why. 
The gloomiest interpretation is that grain factors or Inspectors were 
lackadaisical and bothered to return only some portion of total trade. A more benign 
interpretation is that a great deal of grain was traded outside the market, and hence 
would not appear in the returns. This could occur for perfectly innocent reasons, as 
discussed by Fay (1926, pp. 151-2). For example, we know that nineteenth century 
grain merchants sometimes bought grain “on the stalk” (i.e. before harvesting); such 
transactions would not have been recorded in the monitored markets.6 Similarly, some 
                                                 
5 Fairlie does not discuss the quantities of barley and oats in the returns, but in 1884 (the first year of 
the agricultural census for which relevant output data are available), the proportions of total output 
traded in the returns are 31 per cent and 32 per cent respectively.   
6 Buying “on the stalk” was known legally as engrossing and was outlawed until 1772, although it may 
still have occurred before then; see Gras (1967, pp. 130-2). Farmers selling on the stalk may have 
received a lower price; this would reflect both cost of credit being extended by the grain merchant and 
partial insurance being offered (merchants paid per acre, with only minor ex post adjustments in cases 
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bakers and millers bought directly from farmers without going through monitored 
grain markets (evidence of Alexander Craig; British Government 1834, p. 266). Also, 
markets were not open every day and it is likely that factors were active on non -
market days; perhaps these transactions were omitted from the return given to the 
Inspector (evidence of William Fearnside and Alexander Craig; British Government 
1834, pp. 115, 266 ). Moreover, factors resident in one town but undertaking their 
business in another – such as Manchester factors who traded mainly with Wakefield – 
may not have been asked to make a return (Scola 1992, p.  7). Finally, traders might 
have failed to register trades for nefarious reasons that were unrelated to grain quality 
or price. Scola (1992, p. 158) notes that Manchester traders tried (unsuccessfully) to 
trade outside the market to avoid paying market tolls. From the perspective of 
obtaining a representative sample of prices, these practices are unproblematic because 
it is likely that monitored and non-monitored grains were identical and probably 
traded at the same price. The economist Robert Giffen (1879, p. 711)  argued that 
accurate estimates of true prices could be secured by sampling as little as 20 per cent 
of total grain traded; the Corn Returns certainly represent more than 20 per cent of the 
total, so we need not worry on that account.  
Consider one final point. There was some suspicion that grain factors 
attempted to manipulate the returns (Vamplew 1980a, 5). Factors could conceivably 
do this because some towns had very little trade, so a factor could substantially alter 
the average price by selling a large parcel of grain at an inflated price. This would 
obviously be of great concern to us: it would suggest that some of the prices that we 
observe are not true market prices, just a fiction. Vamplew notes that, under the Act of 
1815, if domestic prices rose above the strike price then foreign grain would be 
admitted tariff-free for several months – so grain factors could import lots of cheap 
foreign grain and make a large profit until market prices were driven down to the 
world price. Hence there might be both a means and an incentive to inflate average 
prices. 
There are four major objections to this argument. First, there is no hard 
evidence that this ever actually occurred – such as a public scandal or a court case – it 
was just rumoured that it might do so. Second, not all prices were used to calculate 
                                                                                                                                            
where the harvest was unexpectedly high or low). There is no reason to suppose that the grain itself 
was systematically different to grain that traded in the market. 
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national averages that were used to regulate imports, so in some markets there would 
have been no i ncentive to manipulate the price.  Third, manipulating market prices 
were not so easy. The averages include only those transactions in which grain 
physically changed hands; factors could include transactions in their returns only once 
the grain was delivered. In that sense all the transactions that we observe are bôna 
fide, and not just paper transactions (evidence of William Fearnside; British 
Government 1834, pp. 114). Fourth, whilst some factors may have wanted to import 
cheap foreign grain, those holding British grain definitely did not want to allow 
imports that would drive down prices of the assets they were holding. How important 
were domestic holdings? The level of imports climbed over the period from around 
nothing in 1770 to around 43 per cent of domestic consumption in 1851 (Mitchell and 
Deane 1962, p. 98; 1851 output estimate from Caird 1852, p. 522); the 1846 repeal of 
the Corn Laws led immediately to a five-fold increase in imports, so imports were 
probably only around 8 per cent of consumption before 1846. Thus the vast majority 
of grain factors had their money invested in domestic grain, rather than foreign grain, 
before 1846. If there were any manipulation then it seems more likely that holders of 
British grain would be working to exclude imports by artificially reducing the 
averages (i.e. selling under-priced parcels of grain in small markets). No one ever 
suggested that this occurred. 
 
2.2  Receiver of Corn Returns 
Returns up t o 30 September 1820 r eported average prices for each county (but see 
appendix 4 on London); figure 2 shows the first published return. No national average 
was published until 1790. The Receiver could publish the average county price in a 
particular week only if he received price data from at least two thirds of towns 
monitored in that county (31 George III, cap. 30, § 67). Now we must ask, what 
exactly do we mean here by an “average price”? Vamplew (1980a, pp. 3-4) criticizes 
the Returns for being based on simple averages. This is only partially true.  
Figure 2. 
 
Prices in each market were calculated as weighted averages (i.e. total value of 
trade divided by total volume of trade). Through most of 1796, Bell’s Weekly 
Messenger reported the official average wheat price for the Mark Lane grain market 
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in London, as well as a breakdown of the quantities traded at each price. Hence we 
could verify that weighted averages had indeed been used in calculating the official 
average price for that market. How were the county averages calculated at this time – 
a weighted average of each of the market prices in the county, or a simple average of 
each of the market prices? We do not  know. Official sources do not  tell us and we 
have found no breakdown that would allow us to infer the method. 
Figure 3. 
 
 The averaging procedure finally becomes clear in 1820. Figure 3 s hows an 
excerpt of a data table published for 8 March 1823. The table took up two entire pages 
of the London Gazette and here we produce the top and bottom of the second page 
(the grey band showing where we omit towns between Cowbridge and Basingstoke). 
Individual town prices are not reported, although it is easy to calculate them: the town 
second from bottom is Southampton, where 10 quarters sold for exactly £20, implying 
a price of 40 shillings per quarter (60 pence per bushel).  Since each town reports total 
quantity traded and total value of trade, any price calculated from these data is 
automatically a weighted average. Average price per quarter reported at the foot of the 
table is 43 shillings and two pence (64.75 pence per bushel), obtained by summing the 
value of all trades from all towns and dividing by the corresponding quantity traded. 
(A simple average of the 150 prices would give 65.7 pence per bushel). This is thus a 
weighted average of the individual town’s prices, rather than a simple average. 
But Vamplew is correct in that these market prices were then aggregated by 
simple averaging to determine county prices, and again by simple averaging to 
generate District and national prices (31 George III, cap. 30, § 52).7 However, 
contrary to Vamplew’s assertion, the difference between weighted average prices and 
simple average prices is small: calculating both for 1821-23, as graphed in figure 4, 
gives a correlation of 0.985. Note also that trade-weighted averages (proposed by 
Vamplew) would not necessarily be better than simple averages. Only a quarter of 
wheat output was traded in monitored markets and we do not know what happened to 
the rest; some large towns reported puzzlingly little trade (such as Bristol), so 
weighting by volume might not give those prices due influence in the average. 
                                                 
7 Although average prices were published for each county, importation was determined by average 
prices of 12 “districts”, each comprising three or four English counties (31 George III, cap. 30, § 54). 
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Alternatively, we could weight town prices by population – obviously relevant if, for 
example, we were interested in changes in the population’s cost of living. 
Figure 4. 
 
Simple averaging is used also in tables of the British Parliamentary Papers. An 
extreme example is in BPP (1881), vol. 83, 720-725, where the average price reported 
for Middlesex is 47 shillings and 2 pence per quarter. This is a simple average of the 
London price (45 shillings) and the Uxbridge price (49 shillings and 5 pence) – even 
though the relative quantities were wildly different (58 255 and 2 8 54 quarters 
respectively). The weighted average would have been only 45 shillings and 2 pence. 
Increased professionalization locally was matched centrally. Town returns 
were published from 1820, rather than county averages. We then get direct evidence 
that each return was checked before publication, since some returns are withheld as 
being an “Incorrect Return”. We do not know how incoming data were checked and 
mistakes discovered; and we cannot be sure that all mistakes were eradicated, since 
the underlying data are lost. But some indication of accuracy levels is given by the 
later period, when prices were reported in shillings and pence to three decimal places. 
For example, on 2 January 1835 the average wheat price was reported as 40 shillings 
and 1.087 pe nce per quarter. This involves summing 150 qua ntities in quarters and 
bushels to get the quantity of 76 915⅜ quarters; and 150 prices to obtain a total value 
of trade of £154 179, 3 shillings, 1 penny. Using the underlying data, we calculate the 
price to be exactly the same. On the other hand there are occasional inconsistencies: 
the national average barley price of 45 shillings reported for 8 August 1801 is lower 
than all of the relevant county prices except Norfolk (our average is 72 shillings) and 
likely to be a printing error.  
In statistical terms, occasional random errors are not problematic. More 
worrying is the possibility of systematic errors, particularly those introduced for 
nefarious purposes. Inspectors carefully investigated any allegations of fictitious 
trades – possibly undertaken to influence the averages – and any trades not 
demonstrably bôna fide were excluded (Jacob 1824, 1825). 
From October 1820 to June 1821, the published format of prices changed: for 
inland counties, only average prices were published; for maritime counties (including 
London), quantities and prices were published at town level. From August 1821 
onwards, data on quantity traded and its value were published at town level. 
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From 1822 to 1842, William Jacob was Receiver of Corn Returns. Jacob was 
an absolute expert on the grain trade (Goodwin 1892, pp. 122-3). He started out as a 
London merchant before becoming an MP; he travelled widely in Europe, collecting 
huge amounts of evidence on t he international grain trade and writing about it 
prolifically (Jacob 1814, 1826, 1828b). He provided much of the evidence considered 
by Parliamentary Committees when the Corn Laws were reformed. The machinery 
could not have been run by a more suitable candidate. Jacob’s successors were 
equally competent. Robert Giffen stands out, becoming Comptroller of Corn Returns 
in 1876. The Returns’ accuracy was questioned in the 1870s because they indicated a 
decline in domestic production. Numerous weaknesses of the Returns were discussed, 
notably various provincial markets persisting in using local measures for trade (then 
converted into Imperial units). This undermined confidence in the data. Giffen’s 
exhaustive investigation of measurement issues concluded (Giffen 1879, p. 717) that 
in the worst-case scenario – where proper conversions had not been made – the 
Returns over-estimated the true average wheat price by 1.25 pe r cent. Several 
previous Parliamentary enquiries had reached the same conclusion (see, for example, 
comparisons of regional (‘customary’) measures and standard measures in British 
Government 1834, pp. 54-6). 
2.3 Publisher 
The final link in the information chain is the publisher. However accurately the 
Receiver calculated the averages, everything comes to nought if the publisher failed to 
render accurate figures. Here we are fortunate because the Returns were not at the 
mercy of a commercial newspaper.  
Returns were published in the official Government newspaper, the London 
Gazette, which started in the seventeenth century and remains in print. Its purpose is 
to convey official information accurately: it did not have to meet commercial profit 
targets, and did not hurry into print with up-to-the-minute news. It carried official 
reports on m ilitary engagements (numerous up t o 1815); and official appointments 
(civil and military). It also carried much commercial and numerical information – 
about banks, bankruptcies, government procurement contracts, auctions of imported 
exotic items (tea and such like). Initially the Returns were published with a two-week 
delay (returns for the week ending Saturday 5 January 1771 a ppeared in print on 
Saturday 19 J anuary 1771). The process accelerated during May 1772, the delay 
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falling to one week for English returns (returns for the week ending Saturday 23 May 
1772 appeared in print on Saturday 30 May 1772).8 Returns for Wales and Scotland 
continued with a two-week delay until 6 J une 1789, w hen they were synchronised 
once again with English returns. Scottish data publication ceased after 1820. 
On one occasion (20 November 1824) the London Gazette published an 
Erratum, noting that figures for three towns were rendered incorrectly in an earlier 
week and giving correct figures. This strongly suggests that published figures were 
checked and corrected where necessary. In sum, available evidence suggests that the 
London Gazette provided a faithful reproduction of figures provided by the Receiver. 
2.4 Work of the researcher. 
Entering data from paper copies posed various challenges, owing to the scale of the 
task, the variable (often poor) print quality and numerous changes in format. 
Nonetheless, we are confident that we achieved a high level of accuracy. Appendix 5 
outlines our approach. 
 
3. Data biases 
The data could be biased in three ways: in geographical coverage (certain regions, or 
types of regions, over- or under-represented); in temporal coverage (certain years, or 
periods within each year, over- or under-represented); in the quality of grains traded 
(high- or low-quality grains more likely to be traded). These biases need not be 
inherent in the system – they might arise from the way the system operated. In 
particular, missing observations are not randomly distributed and we need to consider 
their impact also on data representativeness. 
3.1 Geographical coverage 
We desire a fairly complete geographical coverage. First, we need to know what was 
happening to market prices in every region to link them to other economic data (to 
gauge the price effects of local transport and financial structures, and so on). Second, 
                                                 
8 This acceleration occurred in two stages. The delay for English returns was initially cut to 10 days by 
bringing forward publication of the Returns to the Tuesday edition of the Gazette. The delay was then 
cut by another three days by bringing forward the publication of the Returns to the Saturday edition 
once again. 
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grain production was spread quite evenly across the country, especially before 1840, 
so we need to monitor every region to know what was happening to aggregate grain 
production. Uniformity was driven partly by high transport costs making it efficient to 
produce bulky grain products locally, even if the local climate was poorly suited; and 
it was driven partly by the organic nature of farming, which required mixed crop and 
animal production.9 
What statistic captures completeness of geographical coverage? Suppose that 
all farmers lived within commuting distance of a monitored town (close enough that it 
was economic for them to sell their produce there); then we could say that 
geographical coverage was excellent. Suppose that no f armers lived within 
commuting distance; then we would say that the geographical coverage was awful. So 
let us estimate what percentage of farmers lived within commuting distance of a 
monitored town and see how close we get to our ideal of 100 per cent. 
Table 1 r eports number of monitored towns per 1 000 s quare miles in each 
county in each period. At first glance, the numbers seem rather small – two towns per 
1 000 square miles does not sound like dense coverage. However, take a town and 
drew around it a circle with a radius of 12.6 m iles; the catchment area within the 
circle will be 500 s quare miles. So a density of two towns per 1 000 s quare miles 
implies that (roughly speaking) everyone lived within 12.6 miles of a monitored town. 
Note that the average farmer in 1770 took his wheat 7.5 miles to market; given the 
standard deviation of 5 miles, we know that 84 per cent of farmers travelled 12.6 
miles or less (Brunt 2007, p. 360). In the vast majority of counties in the vast majority 
of years (except 1821-8), the density of coverage was higher than two towns per 1 000 
                                                 
9 To see that grain production was spread fairly evenly, consider the 1867 county agricultural returns. 
For each county, calculate the proportion of land under each crop (as a percentage of crop land or as a 
percentage of total agriculture land). Take the coefficient of variation of these county percentages, 
which tells you how variable they are. A perfectly evenly distributed crop has a coefficient of variation 
of zero; an unevenly distributed crop, such as hops, has a coefficient of 360. The coefficient for wheat 
(as a percentage of either arable land or total agricultural land) was 27 or 47; the coefficient for grain 
crops as a whole was 13 or 34. These are a lot closer to zero than to 360; they are also a closer to zero 
than the coefficients for the non-grain crops, which average 69 or 76. 
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square miles; therefore it is likely that the monitored towns provided market outlets 
for in excess of 84 per cent of farmers. This is close to our ideal of 100 per cent. 
Table 1. 
 
Vamplew suggests that prices were not collected for all areas until 1781 
(Vamplew 1980a, p. 2 ). This is incorrect, as figure 1 s hows. Confusion may arise 
partly from the fact that prices were collected both from maritime counties (used to 
determine the importation of corn) and from inland counties. Maritime town are listed 
in 31 George III cap. 30. § 47 and inland counties are listed in 31 George III cap. 30. 
§ 62, where it states that the prices are to be collected “for the Information and 
Benefit of His Majesty's Subjects”. Collection details are the same in both cases. 
Moreover, prices from Essex, Kent and Sussex (then called the first maritime district) 
were excluded from the average used to regulate imports. 
Between October 1820 and June 1821, t he presentation format changed: 
county averages continued to be reported for inland counties and Essex, Kent and 
Sussex; for the remaining 139 t owns, data were provided separately on quantity of 
trade, value of trade and average price. From June 1821 da ta on i nland counties – 
comprising 28.8 per cent of the national land area – were no longer collected at all, 
thus significantly skewing geographical coverage. In July 1821, t he presentation 
format changed again and data were published for 149 towns in coastal counties 
(including Essex, Kent and Sussex); in March 1823, t he format changed again and 
Cardiff was added, bringing the total to 150 towns. 
Coverage improved significantly, 1828-42, as many Welsh towns were 
removed and numerous towns in inland counties added instead. Only four counties 
were then entirely unrepresented (Herefordshire, Shropshire, Staffordshire and 
Rutland), comprising only 6.7 pe r cent of English and Welsh land area and 5.4 pe r 
cent of population (British Government 1867; Census Returns 1831, 1841;  Mitchell 
and Deane 1862, pp. 8, 20). 
Returns were most comprehensive 1842-64: all counties were represented 
amongst the 290 t owns. The list was again reduced to 150 t owns, 1864-83, with 
geographical coverage almost exactly the same as 1828-42 (only one or two towns 
differed). The situation then improved again, 1883-1914, with town numbers 
increasing slightly and coverage becoming more even (similar to 1771-1820). 
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Thus geographical coverage was generally good, 1770-1914. Over 135 years, 
returns were made for all counties in 94 years and all but four counties in another 34 
years. Only 1821-8 was really deficient, when there was no inland county coverage. 
3.2 Temporal coverage 
Temporal coverage is very extensive and consistent. Returns were published weekly 
throughout every year, 1770-1914. Trade volumes varied little through the year for 
wheat – slightly more for oats – because much grain was stored on the farm and 
released gradually onto the market. Markham (1676, pp. 69-72, 86-7, 92-3) describes 
how farmers could best store grain in stacks in the yard and in special on-farm 
granaries; Jacob (1828a, pp. 284-9) notes that much less grain was being stored by 
farmers in 1827 t han was traditional, owing to credit shortages. But barley was 
different. The market was active soon after the harvest in the autumn/winter, with 
maltsters keen to secure the best quality barley for beer production; then very little 
was traded over the spring/summer (Forsyth 1823, pp. 1-2). Figure 5 illustrates these 
patterns. Vamplew notes that annual average prices are simple averages of 52 
(sometimes 53) weekly prices, suggesting this does not much matter. But we see from 
figure 5 that very little barley was traded March to August – so prices from this half 
of the year are not indicative of prices for which most barley sold. Furthermore, the 
seasonal sales pattern changes slightly for all crops. 
Figure 5. 
 
3.3 Grain quality 
Grain quality varies greatly. Milling a parcel of grain produces several different types 
of flour, ranked according to fineness. Take a bushel each of high- and low-quality 
grain and mill them into flour. Low-quality grain produces fewer ounces of flour in 
total, and a higher proportion of coarse flour – which made lower value bread because 
consumers required a price discount to persuade them to eat brown bread (British 
Government 1797-8, p. 101 and appendix 6, p. 414;  British Government 1834, p.  
485). The value of a bushel of grain is determined by the value of the bread produced; 
so lower quality grain (producing a lower value of bread) sells for a lower price per 
bushel (British Government 1834, 251). For each grain type, there was a quality 
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differential between British and foreign produce, and considerable quality variation 
within the domestic product. This affects grain price data in four important ways. 
First, there was a British-foreign grain price differential. The Corn Returns 
report domestic prices of domestically-produced grain only: foreign grain was 
specifically excluded. Imported grain was typically lower quality and traded at lower 
prices. Charles Pratt’s grain purchase book shows that, for similar quantities of grain 
purchased on the same day in the same market, British grain traded at a 6.4 per cent 
premium (based on multiple pairs of purchases – British and foreign – occurring at 
various dates) (British Government 1797-8, p. 113). Import prices from other sources, 
such as Bell’s Weekly Messenger, almost invariably show imports trading at a lower 
price per bushel. Thus the Returns over-estimate average prices of grain actually 
consumed in Britain. Moreover, since imports were rising as a proportion of 
consumption (Mitchell and Dean 1962), the strength of this effect was rising over 
time (i.e. there was growing divergence between average prices in the Returns and 
average prices of grain consumed). We noted above that imports climbed from 
nothing in 1770 to around 43 pe r cent of domestic consumption in 1851; the climb 
continued thereafter to around 77 per cent of consumption by 1914. This caveat could 
prove important, for example, if grain prices were used to calculate long run changes 
in the cost of living. Given good data on qua ntities and prices of imported grain, 
controlling for this effect would be straightforward. However, no one appears to have 
done so in the literature to date. 
Second, regional variation in quality would affect local grain price levels (Fay 
1924, 216). For example, Lincolnshire farmers grew the wheat variety ‘Rivetts’ – 
highly suited to the Lincolnshire climate and having high yields per acre but selling 
for lower prices per bushel because it was not good for bread-making, being suited 
instead to biscuits (Percival 1934, pp. 69 -73). Such variation generates grain price 
differentials between regions, even with perfectly efficient markets and zero transport 
costs. Currently, the absence of systematic data on regional wheat varieties before 
1914 makes it difficult to control for this effect. 
Third, grain quality varied markedly year-on-year, significantly affecting the 
average price level from year to year. However, this is not apparent from the raw data 
owing to a confounding effect. Bad weather generates a harvest of low quality and 
small quantity. Low grain quality puts downward pressure on pr ices; but small 
quantity puts upward pressure on pr ices (being an adverse supply shock). Since 
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demand for grain was very inelastic (being the staple food product) the quantity effect 
on price outweighs the quality effect. But an important implication is that using time-
series data to estimate elasticity of demand will generate over-estimates of the 
elasticity – because we under-estimate price increases in years of dearth, owing to the 
confounding effect of lower quality. Persson (1999, p. 49)  notes that economic 
historical interpretation is very sensitive to price elasticity of demand estimates: an 
elasticity of -0.5 implies that a five per cent harvest reduction triggers a 10 per cent 
price increase, whereas an estimate of -0.1 implies that a one per cent harvest 
reduction triggers a 10 per cent price increase. Failure to control for annual quality 
fluctuations could move elasticity estimates some way from -0.5 towards -0.1.10 As 
far as we know, no one has controlled for this effect, not even Persson (1999, pp. 52-
4). This issue is important because food demand models, employing price elasticities, 
have been used to estimate output back into the eighteenth century (Allen 1999; 
Crafts 1985). Note further that we need to control for year-on-year variations in flour 
quality when estimating bread output based on grain output. Given good data 
available on grain quality effects on bread making, it would be possible to control for 
these effects (Percival 1934, pp. 69-73). 
Fourth, grain quality can affect the cycle of grain prices within the year. Some 
low-quality grain is produced every year in every locality. This “tail corn” constituted 
perhaps 6.5 per cent of total grain output.11 Low-quality grain bushels had the same 
                                                 
10 Let us adjust wheat prices to reflect quality changes. A high wheat price implies that grain quality 
has fallen by perhaps ten per cent (suppose, for simplicity, that bushel weight has declined from 60lbs 
in an average year to 54lbs). Now reflate the wheat price to what it would have been if wheat had 
remained of average quality (i.e. reflate observed price by ten per cent). Do the opposite for low price 
years. Now prices fluctuate by more in response to a given set of quantities. Elasticity of demand is 
defined as percentage change in quantity demanded over percentage change in price. Percentage 
change in price (the denominator) has become ten per cent larger, so the fraction (elasticity) has 
become ten per cent smaller. Then estimated elasticity will fall from (say) 0.5 to 0.45. 
11 In the first 30 years of Rothamsted experiments (1844-73), tail corn constituted 5.3 per cent of grain 
(by weight) on the plot dunged at the rate of 14 t ons per acre, and 7.7 per cent on the plot never 
dunged. Presumably, national average dunging rates fell somewhere between those two extremes for 
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volume as high-quality (by construction). Occupying the same amount of waggon 
space means it cost the same to send them to market –– but low-quality grain had a 
lower value per bushel. Therefore sending low-quality grain to market was less 
profitable and we systematically observe trade in high-quality grain. Low-quality 
grain was kept on the farm for feeding farm servants or fattening animals (Ellis 1744, 
p. 129). However, suppose that prices were unexpectedly high later in the year. Then 
it would be profitable to send to market low-quality grain that had been expected to be 
consumed on-farm. Then low-quality grains systematically come onto the market later 
in the year, putting downward pressure on t he upswing in prices and leading us to 
under-estimate it.  
Note one further point. It was often not worth sending low-quality grain to 
market, moving average prices upwards. But the best quality grain did not go to 
market, either. It was used as seed and traded directly between farmers12 at a premium 
of around 11 per cent (Winter 1798, p. 131). Since it would never go via a grain factor 
and enter the Returns, this moved averages prices downwards. 
Overall, grain quality variation was substantial and fluid over time. It must be 
considered carefully when using the Corn Returns or other grain prices, lest we draw 
erroneous or inaccurate conclusions. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
most of the period considered here, so we take the average of 6.5 per cent as a rough guide. Lawes and 
Gilbert, ‘On the continuous growth’; ‘Reports’. 
12 Ellis, Agriculture, 109-110 describes mid-eighteenth century farmers selecting the plumpest kernels 
for seed; he notes also in Chiltern and Vale, 339-40, that farmers traded seed directly between each 
other to obtain the highest quality; the same is noted in Trowell, Farmer’s instructor, 9. Maxey talked 
in 1601 of high yields derived from “well-dunged land sown with choicely picked seed”; Marshall 
talked in 1788 of keeping the best ears and using them to build a special stock of seed; the processes of 
“mass selection” of the best ears was advocated as early as Roman times; and “pedigree selection” 
(called in-breeding nowadays) was practised in the nineteenth century. See Percival, Wheat, 43, 75, 83-
4. 
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3.4 Missing observations. 
Very few observations are missing, 1770-1820 – wheat data being 99.7 per cent 
complete, for example. Switching from county to town reporting raised the proportion 
of missing observations – wheat being about 90 pe r cent complete, for example. 
However, more than 90 pe r cent of missing price observations arise from no t rade 
(and hence no price existing). Appendix 6 offers detailed examination of the missing 
price pattern (by crop, time period and geographical location). Overall, we believe 
that missing observations do not devalue or bias the data in any way. 
 
4. Data description 
Consider four main data characteristics: long run price movements; changes in 
relative prices between grains; short period price patterns; regional price variation. 
Figure 6 graphs the wheat price, 1770-1820: the black line is the weekly 
national average price (simple mean of all counties); grey lines show the highest and 
lowest county prices each week to demonstrate price range. Evidently, all county 
prices move together over time – not surprisingly, since they are affected by common 
shocks (supply shocks from the weather and demand shocks from wars and such like). 
These long run price movements are well known; annual Return averages reproduced 
in the Parliamentary Papers have been widely used by researchers. 
Figure 6. 
 
 Figure 7 graphs each grain price, relative to wheat, 1770-1820. Despite short 
term fluctuations, there is no l ong run relative price trend. Although people have 
analysed other agricultural price relatives (Overton 1996, pp. 115 -6, 199-202), we 
have seen no c onsideration of long run relative grain price. One implication of 
constant relative prices is that long run movements of minor grains track wheat prices, 
so long run graphs for barley, etc. look similar to figure 6. 
Figure 7. 
 
5. Conclusions  
The Corn Returns are the most important data source on British grain markets, 1770-
1914. They probably constitute the largest single body of data on the British economy 
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before 1914. W e have examined weaknesses and potential biases of the Returns in 
considerable detail and evaluated them as a source of economic information. Overall, 
they are very good data. They are high-quality – based on extensive underlying 
returns, processed by a competent and thorough administration. They have broad and 
fairly even geographical coverage of England and Wales (less for Scotland). They 
have excellent temporal coverage, being both long run and frequent (weekly).  
However, some issues must be considered when drawing inferences from 
these – and other – grain price data. Economic time series have three characteristics: 
level, trend and fluctuation. Do the Returns accurately reflect these characteristics of 
English grain prices? First, the positive correlation of harvest quality and quantity 
means that price fluctuations are underestimated, owing to confounding changes in 
grain quality. This leads to systematic over-estimation of elasticities of demand. 
Bushel weight data could control for this, although it has not been done in the 
literature. Second, massive increases in the consumption share of imported wheat – 
and its lower price, compared to English wheat – means that the Returns are not a 
good guide to changes in the average consumption price. The Returns series should be 
combined with import data to track accurately cost of living changes;  this does not 
seem to have been done in the literature. Third, change in measurement units (from 
Winchester to Imperial) creates a t hree per cent price step in mid-1827, which 
requires the level of the series being recalculated. 
With appropriate handling, the Corn Returns can provide a firm basis for 
economic analysis and help us to better understand British and international economic 
development during industrialization. 
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Figures and Tables 
Figure 1. Graph of percentage of data in the London Gazette that are missing 
for wheat, 1770-1820 
 
 
Figure 2. Sample of printed return from the London Gazette, November 1770 
 






























































Figure 4. Different average prices of wheat 
 
 







































































Figure 6. The long run price of wheat 
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Price barley / price wheat
Price oats / price wheat
Price beans / price wheat
Structural breaks
30 


















Bedfordshire 6.5 0.0 2.2 6.5 2.2 4.3 4.3 4.3 
Berkshire 4.3 0.0 2.8 8.5 2.8 8.5 8.5 7.1 
Buckinghamshire 4.1 0.0 1.4 5.5 1.4 2.7 2.7 2.7 
Cambridgeshire 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 
Cheshire 3.6 3.6 3.6 6.3 3.6 0.9 0.9 0.9 
Cornwall 4.4 4.4 4.4 7.3 5.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 
Cumberland 2.6 2.6 3.2 5.1 3.2 1.9 1.9 1.9 
Derbyshire 2.9 0.0 1.0 1.9 1.0 1.9 1.0 1.0 
Devonshire 2.3 2.3 2.3 3.5 2.3 2.3 3.5 3.1 
Dorsetshire 6.1 6.1 6.1 7.1 6.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 
Durham 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 4.1 4.1 4.1 
Essex 1.8 1.8 1.8 3.6 0.6 3.6 3.0 3.0 
Gloucestershire 4.0 4.0 4.0 7.2 4.0 2.4 3.2 3.2 
Hampshire 5.4 5.4 5.4 6.0 5.4 4.2 4.2 4.2 
Herefordshire 3.6 0.0 0.0 3.6 0.0 1.2 2.4 2.4 
Hertfordshire 4.9 0.0 3.3 9.8 3.3 6.5 6.5 6.5 
Huntingdonshire 8.4 0.0 2.8 5.6 2.8 8.4 8.4 5.6 
Kent 1.8 1.8 1.8 4.3 2.5 4.3 4.3 3.7 
Lancashire 4.2 4.2 4.2 5.8 4.2 2.6 2.1 2.1 
Leicestershire 3.7 0.0 1.2 5.0 1.2 3.7 3.7 3.7 
Lincolnshire 2.9 2.9 2.9 6.5 2.9 3.2 3.2 3.2 
Middlesex 10.7 0.0 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 
Monmouthshire 6.9 6.9 6.9 8.7 6.9 5.2 5.2 5.2 
Norfolk 5.7 5.7 5.7 6.1 5.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 
Northamptonshire 3.0 0.0 1.0 5.1 1.0 3.0 4.1 3.0 
Northumberland 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 1.5 1.5 1.5 
Nottinghamshire 3.6 0.0 2.4 4.9 2.4 4.9 6.1 6.1 
Oxfordshire 4.1 0.0 1.4 6.8 1.4 4.1 4.1 4.1 
Rutland 13.4 0.0 0.0 6.7 0.0 6.7 6.7 6.7 
Shropshire 2.3 0.0 0.0 5.4 0.0 2.3 3.9 3.9 
Somersetshire 3.7 3.7 3.7 6.1 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 
Staffordshire 2.6 0.0 0.0 7.9 0.0 1.8 2.6 2.6 
Suffolk 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.8 6.1 7.4 8.8 8.8 
Surrey 4.0 0.0 1.3 5.3 1.3 6.7 6.7 6.7 
Sussex 2.0 2.0 2.0 6.8 2.0 3.4 4.1 4.1 
Warwickshire 3.4 0.0 2.3 4.5 2.3 4.5 4.5 4.5 
Westmoreland 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 1.3 1.3 1.3 
Wiltshire 2.2 0.0 0.7 4.4 0.7 3.7 3.0 3.0 
Worcestershire 4.1 0.0 1.4 6.8 1.4 1.4 2.7 2.7 
Yorkshire 1.7 1.2 1.7 4.0 1.7 3.5 3.2 3.2 
London 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
North Wales 5.5 4.8 1.0 2.9 1.0 1.3 1.6 1.6 
South Wales 3.6 2.7 0.7 1.8 0.7 1.1 1.1 0.9 
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 Appendix 1. Market towns reported in the London Gazette 
Table A1 reports the number of towns monitored for the Corn Returns in each period. 
Multiple lines for the same Act, and the same number of towns, indicate a change in 
the reporting format and/or revision to the town list. Table A2 reports the full list of 
towns in each period.  





Data published Parliamentary Act /  
Order of Council 
 From To 
1 10/11/1770 9/10/1790 unknown Prices: forty English counties, 
North and South Wales, London 
10 Geo. III, cap. 39 
2 16/10/1790 15/6/1793 211(a) Prices: forty English counties, 
twelve Welsh counties, London, 
national average 
31 Geo. III, cap. 30 
3 22/6/1793 30/9/1820 210(b) Prices: forty English counties, 
twelve Welsh counties, national 
average 
 
4 7/10/1820 17/2/1821 210 Prices and quantities: 139 towns 
(incl London). Prices: 25 inland 
counties, national average 
1 and 2 Geo. IV, 
cap. 87 
5 24/2/1821 31/3/1821 210 Prices and quantities: 210 towns. 
Prices: 25 inland counties, 
national average 
 
6 7/4/1821 23/6/1821 210 Prices and quantities: 210 towns. 
Prices: 25 inland counties, 
national average 
 
7 30/6/1821 7/7/1821 210 Prices and quantities: 210 towns. 
Prices: 25 inland counties, 
national average 
 
8 14/7/1821 11/8/1821 139 Town prices and quantities; 
national average price 
 
9 18/8/1821 16/2/1822 148 Town prices and quantities; 
national average price 
 
10 23/2/822 2/3/1822 149 Town prices and quantities; 
national average price 
 




Town prices and quantities; 




4/7/1828 150(c) Town prices and quantities; 
national average price 
 
 On 13/7/1827, units change from Winchester to Imperial 7 and 8 Geo. IV, 
cap. 87 
13 11/7/1828 22/4/1842 150 Town prices and quantities; 
national average price 
9 Geo. IV, cap. 60 
14 29/4/1842 31/12/1864 290 Town prices and quantities; 
national average price 
5 Vic. cap. 14 
15 7/1/1865 7/4/1883 150 National average price; total 
quantity 
27 and 28 Vic., cap. 
87 
16 14/4/1883 5/4/1890 187 Town prices; national average 
price; total quantity 
45 and 46 Vic., cap. 
37 (OC 14/2/1883) 
17 12/4/1890 31/12/1900 196 Town prices; national average 
price; total quantity 
45 and 46 Vic., cap. 
37 (OC 12/3/1890) 
18 1/1/1901 31/12/1912 190 Town prices; national average 
price; total quantity 
45 and 46 Vic., cap. 
37 (OC 26/11/1900) 
19 1/1/1913 31/12/1914 173 Town prices; national average 
price; total quantity 
45 and 46 Vic., cap. 
37 (OC 11/10/1912) 
2 
Notes. (a) It is commonly suggested that returns for 1791-1820 are based on 210 English and Welsh 
towns (for example, BPP 1890-91, vol. 65, 165). But the Act makes no mention of London – for which 
data were definitely collected and reported in the London Gazette, until mid-1793 (data for London can 
also be obtained from other publications, such as Bell’s Weekly Messenger until 5 September 1815). So 
there were actually 211 t owns to 1815. (b) Prices and quantities at town level are available for the 
maritime counties for 1819 in BPP 1820, vol. 2, 164-202.  From this we know that four of the original 
towns listed in 31 George III c.30 had been changed by then (Tymawr, Llangollen, Lyme Regis and 
Gosport had been replaced by Llanrwst, Ruthin, Shaston and Havant). We are unable to tell whether 
any of the towns from inland counties were replaced during this time. (c) From 14 June 1823 the table 
in which the data were published changed from two- to four-page format, but the list of towns 
remained the same. (d) The Act of 45 and 46 Victoria, cap. 37 enacted that: “Weekly returns of the 
purchases of British corn should be made under the direction of the Board of Trade in manner provided 
by this Act from such towns, not less than 150 and not more than 200 in number, as may from time to 
time be fixed by Her Majesty in Council, and the average price of British corn shall be from time to 
time ascertained from those returns, and published by the Board of Trade in manner provided by this 
Act”. See BPP 1888, vol. 10, 140. Therefore OC=Order in Council, in the above table.  
 
Table A2. Towns monitored under the Corn Laws (periods 2 to 19; Chapman county codes). 
C’ty  Town 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
AGY Amlwch                   
AGY Beaumaris                   
AGY Llangefni                   
AGY Llanerchymedd                   
BDF Bedford                   
BDF Leighton Buzzard                   
BDF Luton                   
BDF Potton                   
BDF Woburn                   
BRK Abingdon                   
BRK Didcot                   
BRK Hungerford                   
BRK Maidenhead                   
BRK Newbury                   
BRK Reading                   
BRK Wallingford                   
BRK Windsor                   
BRE Brecon                   
BRE Builth                   
BKM Aylesbury                   
BKM Buckingham                   
BKM High Wycombe                   
BKM Newport Pagnell                   
CAM Cambridge                   
CAM Ely                   
CAM Wisbech                   
CGN Aberystwyth                   
CGN Cardigan                   
CGN Lampeter                   
CMN Carmarthen                   
CMN Kidwelly                   
CMN Llandeilo                   
CAE Bangor                   
CAE Caernarfon                   
CAE Conwy                   
CAE Pwllheli                   
CHS Chester                   
CHS Congleton                   
CHS Four Lane Ends                   
CHS Macclesfield                   
CHS Middlewich                   
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CHS Nantwich                   
CHS Stockport                   
CHS Tarporley                   
CON Bodmin                   
CON Callington                   
CON Falmouth                   
CON Helston                   
CON Launceston                   
CON Liskeard                   
CON Penzance                   
CON Redruth                   
CON St Austell                   
CON St Columb                   
CON Truro                   
CON Wadebridge                   
CUL Carlisle                   
CUL Cockermouth                   
CUL Egremont                   
CUL Maryport                   
CUL Penrith                   
CUL Whitehaven                   
CUL Wigton                   
CUL Workington                   
DEN Denbigh                   
DEN Llangollen                   
DEN Llanrwst                   
DEN Ruthin                   
DEN Tymawr                   
DEN Wrexham                   
DBY Ashburn                   
DBY Chesterfield                   
DBY Derby                   
DEV Barnstaple                   
DEV Exeter                   
DEV Honiton                   
DEV Kingsbridge                   
DEV Newton Abbot                   
DEV Okehampton                   
DEV Plymouth                   
DEV Tavistock                   
DEV Tiverton                   
DEV Totnes                   
DOR Blandford Forum                   
DOR Bridport                   
DOR Dorchester                   
DOR Lyme Regis                   
DOR Poole                   
DOR Shaftesbury                   
DOR Sherborne                   
DOR Wareham                   
DOR Wimborne                   
DUR Barnard Castle                   
DUR Bishop Auckland                   
DUR Darlington                   
DUR Durham                   
DUR Stockton                   
DUR Sunderland                   
DUR Wolsingham                   
ESS Braintree                   
ESS Chelmsford                   
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ESS Chipping Ongar                   
ESS Colchester                   
ESS Maldon                   
ESS Romford                   
ESS Saffron Walden                   
FLN Holywell                   
FLN Mold                   
GLA Cardiff                   
GLA Cowbridge                   
GLA Neath                   
GLA Swansea                   
GLS Cheltenham                   
GLS Cirencester                   
GLS Dursley                   
GLS Gloucester                   
GLS Northleach                   
GLS Stow-on-the-Wold                   
GLS Stroud                   
GLS Tetbury                   
GLS Tewkesbury                   
HAM Andover                   
HAM Basingstoke                   
HAM Christchurch                   
HAM Fareham                   
HAM Gosport                   
HAM Havant                   
HAM Newport (HAM)                   
HAM Portsmouth                   
HAM Ringwood                   
HAM Southampton                   
HAM Winchester                   
HEF Hereford                   
HEF Kington                   
HEF Leominster                   
HEF Ross-on-Wye                   
HRT Bishop's Stortford                   
HRT Hemel Hempstead                   
HRT Hertford                   
HRT Hitchin                   
HRT Royston                   
HRT St Albans                   
HUN Huntingdon                   
HUN St Ives                   
HUN St Neots                   
KEN Ashford                   
KEN Canterbury                   
KEN Chatham & Rochester                   
KEN Dartford                   
KEN Dover                   
KEN Gravesend                   
KEN Maidstone                   
KEN Rochester                   
KEN Sandwich                   
KEN Tenterden                   
KEN Tonbridge                   
LAN Blackburn                   
LAN Bolton                   
LAN Bury                   
LAN Garstang                   
LAN Lancaster                   
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LAN Liverpool                   
LAN Manchester                   
LAN Ormskirk                   
LAN Preston                   
LAN Rochdale                   
LAN Ulverston                   
LAN Warrington                   
LAN Wigan                   
LEI Ashby-de-la-Zouch                   
LEI Hinckley                   
LEI Leicester                   
LEI Loughborough                   
LEI Lutterworth                   
LEI Melton Mowbray                   
LIN Alford                   
LIN Barton-upon-Humber                   
LIN Boston                   
LIN Bourne                   
LIN (Glandford) Brigg                   
LIN Caistor                   
LIN Gainsborough                   
LIN Grantham                   
LIN Grimsby                   
LIN Holbeach                   
LIN Horncastle                   
LIN Lincoln                   
LIN Long Sutton                   
LIN Louth                   
LIN Market Rasen                   
LIN Sleaford                   
LIN Spalding                   
LIN Stamford                   
LND London                   
MER Bala                   
MER Corwen                   
MER Dolgellau                   
MDX Brentford                   
MDX Staines                   
MDX Uxbridge                   
MON Abergavenny                   
MON Chepstow                   
MON Monmouth                   
MON Newport (MON)                   
MON Pontypool                   
MGY Montgomery                   
MGY Newtown                   
MGY Pool                   
MGY Welshpool                   
NFK Aylsham                   
NFK Diss                   
NFK East Dereham                   
NFK Fakenham                   
NFK Harleston                   
NFK Holt                   
NFK (King’s) Lynn                   
NFK North Walsham                   
NFK Norwich                   
NFK Swaffham                   
NFK Thetford                   
NFK Walsingham                   
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NFK Watton                   
NFK Wymondham                   
NFK (Great) Yarmouth                   
NTH Daventry                   
NTH Kettering                   
NTH Northampton                   
NTH Peterborough                   
NTH Wellingborough                   
NBL Alnwick                   
NBL Belford                   
NBL Berwick-upon-Tweed                   
NBL Hexham                   
NBL Morpeth                   
NBL Newcastle upon Tyne                   
NTT Mansfield                   
NTT Newark-on-Trent                   
NTT Nottingham                   
NTT Retford                   
NTT Worksop                   
OXF Banbury                   
OXF Bicester                   
OXF Burford                   
OXF Chipping Norton                   
OXF Henley-on-Thames                   
OXF Oxford                   
OXF Witney                   
PEM Fishguard                   
PEM Haverfordwest                   
PEM Pembroke                   
RAD Knighton                   
RAD Presteigne                   
RUT Oakham                   
RUT Uppingham                   
SAL Bridgnorth                   
SAL Ludlow                   
SAL Market Drayton                   
SAL Newport (SAL)                   
SAL Oswestry                   
SAL Shrewsbury                   
SAL Wellington (SAL)                   
SAL Wenlock                   
SAL Whitchurch                   
SOM Bath                   
SOM Bridgewater                   
SOM Bristol                   
SOM Chard                   
SOM Frome                   
SOM Shepton Mallet                   
SOM Somerton                   
SOM Taunton                   
SOM Wellington (SOM)                   
SOM Wells                   
SOM Wiveliscombe                   
SOM Yeovil                   
STS Burton upon Trent                   
STS Lichfield                   
STS Newcastle-under-Lyme                   
STS Stafford                   
STS Stone                   
STS Uttoxeter                   
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STS Walsall                   
STS Wolverhampton                   
SFK Beccles                   
SFK Bungay                   
SFK Bury St Edmunds                   
SFK Eye                   
SFK Framlingham                   
SFK Hadleigh                   
SFK Halesworth                   
SFK Haverhill                   
SFK Ipswich                   
SFK Lowestoft                   
SFK Newmarket                   
SFK Saxmundham                   
SFK Stowmarket                   
SFK Sudbury                   
SFK Woodbridge                   
SRY Croydon                   
SRY Dorking                   
SRY Farnham                   
SRY Guildford                   
SRY Kingston-on-Thames                   
SRY Redhill                   
SRY Reigate                   
SSX Arundel                   
SSX Battle                   
SSX Brighton                   
SSX Chichester                   
SSX East Grinstead                   
SSX Hastings                   
SSX Hayward's Heath                   
SSX Horsham                   
SSX Lewes                   
SSX Midhurst                   
SSX Pulborough                   
SSX Rye                   
SSX Shoreham                   
WAR Birmingham                   
WAR Coventry                   
WAR Rugby                   
WAR Stratford-upon-Avon                   
WAR Warwick                   
WES Appleby-in-Westmorland                   
WES Burton                   
WES Kendal                   
WIL Chippenham                   
WIL Devizes                   
WIL Marlborough                   
WIL Salisbury                   
WIL Swindon                   
WIL Trowbridge                   
WIL Warminster                   
WOR Bromsgrove                   
WOR Evesham                   
WOR Kidderminster                   
WOR Stourbridge                   
WOR Worcester                   
YKS Barnsley                   
YKS Bedale                   
YKS Beverley                   
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YKS Bradford                   
YKS Bridlington                   
YKS Doncaster                   
YKS Driffield                   
YKS Easingwold                   
YKS Goole                   
YKS Halifax                   
YKS Howden                   
YKS Hull                   
YKS Knaresborough                   
YKS Leeds                   
YKS Malton                   
YKS Northallerton                   
YKS Otley                   
YKS Penistone                   
YKS Pickering                   
YKS Pontefract                   
YKS Richmond                   
YKS Ripon                   
YKS Rotherham                   
YKS Scarborough                   
YKS Selby                   
YKS Sheffield                   
YKS Skipton                   
YKS Snaith                   
YKS Thirsk                   
YKS Thorne                   
YKS Wakefield                   
YKS Whitby                   
YKS York                   
 
Appendix 2. Nomenclature 
Town nomenclature is erratic in the London Gazette. Two particular issues arise.  
First, spelling is inconsistent and sometimes incorrect. Occasionally this is a 
pure printing error (such as 19 May 1821, Stamford and Spalding appearing as 
“Spamford” and Stalindg”). Inconsistent spelling is more problematic. For example, 
initially returns are reported for the town of Tunbridge in Kent; latterly this changes to 
Tonbridge. There is no Tunbridge in Kent – but there is Tunbridge Wells and there is 
Tonbridge, so this is ambiguous. Given the spelling change to Tonbridge, it seems 
likely that the early returns were actually gathered from Tonbridge and we have 
assumed this throughout. 
Second, some town names changed. For example, initially returns are reported 
for the town of Glanford Brigg in Lincolnshire (also spelt Glandford Briggs and 
Glandford Bridge!); latterly this changes to Brigg. These names definitely refer to the 
same town throughout because we can identify the location on Moule’s and Pigot’s 
contemporary maps. Cann in Dorset changed more radically, becoming known as 
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Shaston St Rumbold (an area on t he periphery of the town of Salisbury, itself 
sometimes known as Shaston). 
To eliminate ambiguities, we adopted modern names and spellings for all 
towns, 1770-1914, as used by the Ordnance Survey. Except for Brigg and Cann, 
modern spellings are close to the original returns and anyone using our data will find 
it straightforward to match up the lists of towns that we report and the lists reported in 
the London Gazette.  
MOULE, T. (1836). Moule’s English counties. London: George Virtue. 
ORDNANCE SURVEY (1999). Ordnance Survey gazetteer of the British Isles. 4th 
edition. London: HMSO. 
PIGOT, J. (1840). Pigot & Co.’s Brtish Atlas. London: Pigot & Co. 
 
Appendix 3. Bristol  
In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries Bristol was an important commercial 
city with a thriving grain market, lying astride the Somersetshire-Gloucestershire 
border. Was Bristol included in Somersetshire or Gloucestershire for purposes of 
computing county average grain prices, 1770-1820? A town-level breakdown for 1819 
was given in response to a Parliamentary enquiry (BPP 1820, vol. 2, “Appendix to the 
report from Select Committee on petitions relating to agricultural distress”, p. 164 ). 
This enabled us to calculate county averages under the assumptions that: a) Bristol was 
in Somersetshire; and b) Bristol was in Gloucestershire. Comparing these calculations 
to the printed county returns establishes that Bristol was in Somersetshire. 
 
Appendix 4. London 
Remarkably, London is the only town for which average prices were not continuously 
reported in the Returns, disappearing from the London Gazette after 8 June 1793 and 
reappearing on 7 October 1820. This is problematic, given the importance of London 
in the British economy. 
 Prices in Mark Lane – the London grain market – were reported weekly in The 
Times from 5 J anuary 1796 to 5 September 1815 and we use those. The same data 
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were reported in other newspapers, although not with equal consistency and accuracy; 
hence we prefer The Times whenever possible. As well as reporting prices this week, 
they reported changes from last week – allowing us to calculate prices in the 
occasional weeks when data were (inexplicably) not printed. Data missing from The 
Times were filled using Bell’s Weekly Messenger. (We verified that – when both 
newspapers report Mark Lane prices – the reported prices were the same in both 
publications. This gave us confidence in taking prices from Bell’s Weekly Messenger 
when The Times failed to report.) We used The Sun, 12 M arch 1793-23 December 
1794; and The General Evening Post, 29 December 1794-28 December 1795. 
 London price data are totally missing, 12 September 1815-30 September 1820. 
(Prices reported for ‘London’ in The Times, 1 September 1817-18 December 1820, 
turn out to be the national average price, not the London price.) Although this is 
almost unbelievable, we checked very many contemporary newspapers and nowhere 
found weekly data for Mark Lane in that period. 
 
Appendix 5. The researcher 
Entering data from paper copies posed various problems, especially from 10 
November 1770 (when publication began) to 8 March 1823. The London Gazette is 
available in various libraries, or on microfilm, but it is inconvenient to transcribe the 
data in situ and our data were mostly transcribed from photocopies. Very faint 
printing or considerable bleed-through from the next page were problematic. Figure 1 
provides an example of the hard copy quality; the publisher used a very small type, 
tiring to read for prolonged periods. These data had to be transcribed manually, which 
was painfully slow but extremely accurate. We randomly double-checked two weeks 
(after the checking process described below) and found data entry to be 100 per cent 
accurate.  
Publication quality improved on 15 M arch 1823. Pages became less cluttered 
because regional sub-totals were suppressed, allowing the use of a larger font. Returns 
for 150 towns were spread over four whole pages; from 29 April 1842, returns for 290 
towns were spread over eight whole pages. Printing and paper quality were much 
higher and there were no legibility problems. We used a variety of procedures to enter 
these data, including manual typing and scanning with Optical Character Recognition 
(OCR) software. Scanning was less accurate than typing but much faster (averaging 5 
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000 digits entered per hour, including data management tasks, rather than 2 000 digits 
per hour). We randomly double-checked two weeks (after the checking process 
described below) and found data entry to be 97 per cent accurate. Inaccuracies arise 
because the OCR software sometimes misrecognises digits, usually if the printing is 
blotchy or the paper flecked. Typical errors are numerals 3 or  6 being mistaken for 
numeral 8. 
Following raw data entry, we undertook various checks to attempt to eliminate 
transcription errors.  
First, published data up to 1820 are simply prices per bushel in shillings and 
pence. Graphing the data for each year for each county allowed us to pinpoint 
suspicious price jumps. Notably, errors in entering shillings lead to price jumps of 12, 
24 or 36 pence; with average wheat prices to 1820 of 100 pence per bushel, weekly 
jumps of 12 or  24 pence stood out. Hence any transcription errors that we failed to 
notice probably come from the pence column and are therefore likely to be small. 
Second, published data after 1820 report total value and total quantity of each 
grain traded in each town. Most of the data were scanned from photocopies that were 
very dark (sometimes illegible) along the edge bound into the spine of the volumes; 
for every page for every week we checked columns closest to the spine to ensure 
correct scanning. We also checked the page ordering (sometimes pages were bound 
together in the wrong order, something not always apparent at first glance). Average 
unit prices were then calculated, dividing total value traded by total quantity traded. 
We wrote a programme highlighting highest and lowest prices each week for each 
type of grain; these were typically erroneous and had to be corrected. 
Obviously, we desire 100 per cent accuracy in data transcription, and could 
achieve it if all data were entered manually and checked graphically. However, the 
increased accuracy would not justify the additional cost. An alternative way of 
conceptualizing the problem is choosing between entering 100 pe r cent of the data 
with 97 pe r cent accuracy and entering 40 per cent with 100 p er cent accuracy. It 
seems clear that precision of our estimates (for example, using regression techniques) 
will be higher if we collect 100 per cent with 97 per cent accuracy. Hence we believe 





Appendix 6. Missing observations. 
Consider first the period after 7 October 1820, when returns for individual towns were 
published (not just county averages). Price observations can be missing for four 
reasons, and the cause of each missing observation is described according to the 
following system.  
First, it could be that no Inspector was appointed for a particular market. This 
occurred very rarely, recorded in the London Gazette as ‘No Inspector’. In 1820-5, the 
only towns without an Inspector were Swansea (20-27 April 1822) and Kidwelly (17 
November 1821-30 March 1822). 
Second, the Inspector might fail to send a return, recorded as ‘No Return’.  
Third, the Inspector might send an incorrect return . F rom 1821 onw ards, a 
wholly incorrect return was recorded as ‘Incorrect Return’; for just one or two crops, 
‘Incorrect’ was entered for that particular column or columns. Use of ‘Incorrect’ for 
individual crops begins on 8 September 1821. Before that, we observe only ‘Incorrect 
Return’. Presumably, before 8 September 1821 the Receiver discarded the whole 
return if even one crop was incorrect; this was perhaps unnecessarily harsh, so policy 
changed. The policy change impact is clear from table 2: a discrete drop of 80 pe r 
cent between 1821 and 1822 in the number of missing observations due to ‘Incorrect 
Return’. This is because ‘Incorrect Return’ generates five missing price observations 
(wheat, barley, oats, beans and peas), whereas ‘Incorrect’ generates only one missing 
price observation. It is not clear how the Comptroller knew that the return was 
incorrect – probably it was internally inconsistent (volume traded multiplied by price 
per unit did not equal value traded). For one week only, the legend ‘Irregular Return’ 
is employed (23 December 1820). It is not clear how this differed from ‘Incorrect 
Return’, so we treat them the same way. 
Fourth, no t rade might occur, recorded as ‘None Sold’ or, when just one or 
two crops, a dash in that particular column or columns ‘ – ’. When there was no trade 
then we enter a zero for the quantity. But, in the absence of trade, we do not observe a 
price and hence we have a missing price observation. In early 1821, the legend ‘None 
Brought for Sale’ was employed (for example, 31 March 1821). Presumably, the use 
of ‘None Sold’ then indicated a situation where grain was brought for sale but there 
were no bu yers. However, this distinction was soon dropped and only ‘None Sold’ 
appeared thereafter; we treat the two cases in the same way. 
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Our grain price spread sheets do not  describe why particular prices 
observations are missing. But we may wish to know why price data are typically 
missing – whether it was due to no trade or poor reporting – and an additional spread 
sheet records this fact. For 1820-22, table A3 shows the number of prices missing for 
each crop in each year owing to: no t rade; something ‘Incorrect’ in the return; or 
having ‘No Return’. The vast majority of missing observations arise from no trade: in 
the first period – immediately following the drastic change in the town list, when 
things were probably less well organized than usual – 82 per cent of missing 
observations were due to no trade; this rose to 94 per cent in the second period. It was 
more common for minor crops prices to be missing; zero trade was more likely for a 
minor crop in any particular week.  
Table A3. Breakdown of missing observations by crop and by cause, 1820-2 
Grain Cause of missing price 7 October 1820-11 August 1821 18 August 1821-29 December 1822 
  139 towns × 45 weeks =  
6255 observations per grain 
148 towns × 20 weeks =  
2960 observations per grain 
Wheat No sale 422 (7%) 237 (8%) 
 No return 130 (2%) 51 (2%) 
 Incorrect 510 (8%) 67 (2%) 
Barley No sale 2026 (32%) 1045 (35%) 
 No return 130 (2%) 51 (2%) 
 Incorrect 510 (8%) 51 (2%) 
Oats No sale 2476 (40%) 1281 (43%) 
 No return 130 (2%) 51 (2%) 
 Incorrect 510 (8%) 35 (1%) 
Beans No sale 4483 (72%) 2179 (74%) 
 No return 130 (2%) 51 (2%) 
 Incorrect 510 (8%) 24 (1%) 
Peas No sale 4981 (80%) 2445 (83%) 
 No return 130 (2%) 51 (2%) 
 Incorrect 510 (8%) 25 (1%) 
Notes. Prices were collected from 210 towns, 7 October 1820-7 July 1821, but published for only 139 
towns (remaining towns published as county averages and not counted in this table). 
 
Now consider the geographical pattern of missing observations. Table A4 
shows that there are very few missing observations for wheat in major markets; the 
vast majority of missing observations were concentrated in a very small number of 
towns. Some towns had minimal trade. Lampeter reported no t rade for the entire 
period 1822-28; other remote Welsh towns also had little trade (for example, 
Beaumaris reported trade in wheat in only nine weeks of 1824, with a total trade of 
120 quarters). Fortunately, the only major town that did not have much trade was 
Southampton, perhaps because most trade occurred in nearby Portsmouth. Systematic 
data analysis for these towns is probably not worthwhile and they are simply best 
ignored. More importantly, variation in weekly quantity totals is probably affected by 
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occasional missing returns from large markets that usually report. For example, Hull 
produced no return on 11 August 1821; around that time, Hull accounted for two per 
cent of total trade in the 139 reporting towns. Omitting Hull is unlikely to 
substantially affect the average reported price because, although it is a large market, 
the price there was similar to prices in the rest of the county. (Obviously, in the 
extreme case where the price in Hull was exactly the same as the average, then 
omission would have no effect at all.) However, omission has a much larger impact 
on reported total quantity traded, which Fairlie used to estimate total grain output.  
 Table A4. Geographical distribution of missing prices 
7 October 1820-11 August 1821 45 weeks 18 August 1821-29 December 1821 20 weeks 
Denbigh 18 Beccles 14 
Watton 18 Cirencester 12 
Cirencester 16 Manchester 9 
Kidwelly 11 Kidwelly 8 
York 11 Swansea 8 
Aylesham 9 Sunderland 6 
Chard 9 Fareham 4 
Lynn 9 Redruth 4 
Ringwood 9 Tetbury 4 
St. Austle 9 Bala  3 
Wells 9 Louth 3 
Wisbeach 9 Pontipool 3 
Towns missing 8 observations 7 Towns missing 2 observations 8 
Towns missing 7 observations 6 Towns missing 1 observation 30 
Towns missing 6 observations 10 Towns missing no observation 98 
Towns missing 5 observations 10   
Towns missing 4 observations 12   
Towns missing 3 observations 17   
Towns missing 2 observations 24   
Towns missing 1 observation 18   
Towns missing no observation 27   
Notes. Small changes in town lists mean that the column total for 1820-21 exceeds total number of 
towns monitored in that period. To August 1821, many towns have missing/incorrect observations. 
Thereafter most missing/incorrect observations result from no returns from Beccles, Cirencester and 
Manchester. Some returning officers appear to have consistently made incorrect returns . 
 
Finally, up t o 30 S eptember 1820, grain prices were published as county 
averages. Causes of missing price observations were not revealed. The Receiver 
would not publish a county average if fewer than two thirds of Inspectors made a 
return. Returns from various Inspectors within a county could be missing for a variety 
of reasons, so it may not be straightforward to reveal why a price observation was 
missing. The frequency of each type of missing observation after 1820 suggests the 
most likely explanation for missing observations before 1820 is simply ‘None Sold’. 
Table A5 reports how much data we have for each crop for English and Welsh 
counties (as a percentage of the total possible amount of data, given the number of 
15 
counties and weeks, 1770-1820). Notice that beans are noticeably lower than the rest. 
Bean prices are basically never reported in Wales, Cornwall, Devon, Derbyshire and 
Cheshire, probably because very few beans were produced in those counties. The 
1867 agricultural census reports vanishingly small acreages of beans in Wales, 
Cornwall and Devon; and very small acreages in Derbyshire and Cheshire. Hence 
there was probably virtually no trade in beans in those counties. By contrast, bean 
prices are reported almost every week in the other counties. 
Table A5. Reporting rates for grain price data, 1770-1820 
 40 English counties 2 Welsh regions 
Wheat 99.7 93.0 
Barley 93.1 92.6 
Oats 97.2 88.0 
Beans 79.0 15.7 
 
One further point is worth noting. Publishing county averages up t o 1820, 
even if one third of towns did not report, could generate measurement error owing to a 
non-constant sample of towns. There is no way to further illuminate this issue.  
The proportion of price data missing from the Returns is very low and heavily 
concentrated in a few remote towns, such as Lampeter. We can afford to exclude 
those towns from our analysis (regional coverage being adequate due to complete 
returns for nearby towns). Hence there is no problem at all with missing observations. 
Pea and bean coverage is less satisfactory but – given that the vast majority of missing 
observations occur because there is no trade, and therefore no price – we do not feel 
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